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In exploring why innovators often do not profit from their innovations, researchers concentrate
on innovators versus imitators and the extent to which owners of complementary assets capture
profits from innovations. The literature provides scant attention to factors that sap profits from
innovations. This paper argues that an innovator’s positioning vis-à-vis customers, suppliers,
complementors, and other co-opetitors plays a critical role in the innovator’s profitability. The
article explores how an innovator can use new game strategies to better positioning, thus
capturing rents from innovations and enabling further innovations in the future. The study
examines the case of Lipitor, one of the world’s best-selling drug, to illustrate how positioning
can play in a firm’s ability to profit from its innovations.
1. Introduction
Why do innovating firms often fail to profitfrom their innovations? In answering this
question, Teece (1986) argues that the extent to
which a firm can profit from its innovation is a
function of the degree to which the innovation
can be imitated and whether the firm or a poten-
tial imitator has the relevant important comple-
mentary assets. He focuses on the competition
between the innovator and imitators to capture
rents from the innovation and who has estab-
lished prior positions in specialized or co-specia-
lized complementary assets. Subsequent research
focuses on new entrants versus incumbents
and who has the relevant complementary assets
(Mitchell, 1989; Tripsas, 1997; Rothaemel,
2001; Chesbrough, 2003). For example, Tripsas
(1997) shows that incumbents are more likely to
maintain their competitive advantage in the face
of a radical technological innovation than new
entrants if the incumbents have the right comple-
mentary assets. Rothaemel (2001) finds that com-
plementary assets are equally helpful to
incumbent pharmaceutical companies, while
Mitchell (1989) shows that an incumbent firm is
more likely to enter a new technical subfield if its
core product was threatened, and possessed in-
dustry-specialized complementary assets.
This focus on innovator versus imitator, incum-
bent versus new entrant and complementary assets
is understandable given the critical roles these
actors and complementary assets play in creating
and capturing value. However, co-opetitors (sup-
pliers, customers, complementors, followers, imi-
tators, universities, professional bodies, and other
institutions with whom an innovator cooperates
or competes) also play critical roles in creating and
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appropriating value during innovation (Afuah
and Bahram, 1995; Brandenburger and Stuart,
1996). In fact, Teece (1986) points out that custo-
mers, suppliers, innovators, imitators, and other
followers all determine the share of profits cap-
tured by the innovator (286).
This paper goes beyond imitability and com-
plementary assets and focuses on the co-opetitors’
capturing rents from a firm’s innovation and the
strategic steps that the innovator-firm can take to
protect rents from innovation. This paper ex-
plores why and how new game strategies can
help an innovator better position vis-à-vis co-
opetitors, not only to appropriate rents from
innovations, but also to better innovate. Table 1
and Figure 1 show the differences between
Teece (1986) and this paper. The main distin-
guishing characteristic of actors in this model is to
attain an advantageous positioning vis-à-vis co-
opetitors, using new game strategies.
In detailing why and how new game strategies
are applicable to better position an innovator to
profit from innovations, this paper goes beyond
strategic management’s product-market position
(PMP) (Porter, 1980; Teece et al., 1997) and the
resource-based view (RBV) of the firm (e.g.,
Barney and Arikan, 2001) in three ways. First,
how firms can use new game strategies to attain
desired PMPs or to build distinctive resources and
capabilities are explored. PMP and RBV say very
little about the origins of profitable positions or
distinctive capabilities. Second, recognizing posi-
tioning to be more than just bargaining power,
this paper explores positioning as cooperating.
Third, recognizing that the appropriability regime
and complementary assets are resources or cap-
abilities, this paper is a reminder that profiting
from resources often entails a smooth transition
into PMPs. Although the RBV of the firm argues
that resources and capabilities are at the root of a
Table 1. Beyond imitability and complementary assets
Teece (1986) This paper
1 Actors (primary) Innovators – imitators Innovator – co-opetitors (suppliers, customers,
complementors, followers, imitators,





Complementary assets (how important
and co-specialized or specialized)
Profitability
When imitation of innovation is high,
rents accrue to the actor with the right
complementary assets
Positioning vis-à-vis co-opetitors (suppliers,
customers, complementors, followers,
imitators, universities, professional bodies, and
other institutions)
Imitability and complementary assets
Profitability
When an innovator is well positioned, it can earn
economic rents
3 Goal of innovator Establish a prior position in
complementary assets






(So as to obtain complementary assets)
Pursue new game activities. These may include
collaboration, vertical integration, and any
other activity that better positions the
innovator vis-à-vis co-opetitor. Activities take
advantage of (1) industry value drivers and (2)
co-opetitors’ prior commitments (includes
acquisition of competitors)
New game activities can also impact innovation
and complementary assets, not just positioning
5 Conclusion Complementary assets are critical to
profiting from innovation. Therefore
establish a prior position in
complementary asset through
collaboration or integration.
Follow-on papers (Mitchell, 1989;
Tripsas, 1997; Rothaemel, 2001) focus
on incumbent versus new entrant
Positioning vis-à-vis co-opetitors (suppliers,
customers, complementors, followers,
imitators, universities, professional bodies, and
other institutions) is critical to profiting from
innovation (or influencing industry structure)
Therefore use a new game strategy to establish
prior position in bargaining, etc with co-
opetitors.
Firm can still not make money even when its
technology is not imitable or it has the right co-
specialized complementary assets
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firm’s competitive advantage, these must still
translate into something that customers want.
The case of Lipitor, the world’s best-selling
drug in 2005, illustrates these arguments, espe-
cially the role that new game strategies can play in
the profitability of an innovation, even when the
innovation is difficult to imitate and complemen-
tary assets are important and tightly held.
2. Background literature: the role of
positioning
The creation and appropriation of value in in-
novations is not limited to innovators and imita-
tors: innovators and some subset of co-opetitors
also become involved (Figure 1). For example,
value creation in Airbus’ A380 Super Jumbo
airplane was captured by its networks of suppliers
of innovative components, by airline companies
that must configure parts of the plane the way
they want them, and by the networks of aero-
nautical and electrical engineers that shared their
expertise with Airbus’ engineers. The ability of an
innovator to profit from innovation is not only a
function of innovation imitability and ownership
of the relevant difficult-to-imitate complementary
assets but also a function of the innovator’s
positioning vis-à-vis co-opetitors.
2.1. PMP: how co-opetitors can sap
innovators’ profits
To understand how co-opetitors sap an innova-
tor’s profits, consider the role that a supplier plays
in an innovator’s profitability. If a supplier has
bargaining power over an innovator, this can
increase the innovator’s cost by charging the
innovator higher prices. A powerful supplier can
also force the innovator to buy inputs that have
lower quality than the supplier would like. In
either case, the result is lower profits for the
innovator even if scarce co-specialized or specia-
lized complementary assets existed and the inno-
vation was not imitable. A customer that has
bargaining power over an innovator can extract
price concessions from the innovator, thereby
paying the innovator lower prices than deserved.
Powerful customers can also force the innovator
to deliver higher quality for the price of low-
quality products, increasing the innovator’s costs.
A monopoly complementor who charges very
high prices for complements can decrease an
innovator’s sales. Effectively, an innovator’s po-
sitioning vis-à-vis suppliers, customers, and com-
plementors plays a critical role in the innovator’s
ability to profit from innovations.
The effect of an innovator’s positioning vis-à-
vis co-opetitors on profitability is summarized in
Figure 2. The vertical axis depicts the variable
‘Complementary Assets’ while the horizontal axis
depicts ‘Innovator’s Positioning vis-à-vis Co-ope-
titors.’ If the innovator has a weak position and
complementary assets are unimportant or generic,
then innovators do not make money, even if the
innovation is difficult to imitate (Quadrant I of
Figure 2). For example, publishers have power
over first-time authors, leading to less money for
new authors, even though they may have innova-
tive ideas.
The more common and interesting case is
represented in Quadrant II where even though
complementary assets are important and tightly
held (or co-specialized), the innovator may still
not be able to make money because of weak
positioning vis-à-vis suppliers, customers, or com-
plementors – even when the innovation is difficult
to imitate. Some patented pharmaceutical drugs
marketed by established firms fall into this cate-
gory. These pharmaceutical firms have tightly
held complementary assets (such as sales force
and distribution channels) but health manage-
ment organizations have so much power that
some innovative drugs have little chance of get-
ting to patients. Moreover, they may obtain
licenses from university labs that have enough
power to appropriate most of the profits from the
drug via high license fees.
Quadrant III shows an ideal situation for an
innovator: the innovator has bargaining power
over suppliers, customers, or complementors and













Figure 1. The innovation value-added chain.
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boot. Software innovations from Microsoft
would fall into this category because Microsoft’s
power over PC makers and end-customers. More-
over, Microsoft has co-specialized complemen-
tary assets such as its installed base of
customers, brand, and relationships with comple-
mentors and customers. Copyright laws protect
its software.
The situation represented by Quadrant IV is
also interesting. If an innovator has strong posi-
tioning – in other words, having bargaining
power over suppliers, customers, or complemen-
tors – the innovator can make money from
innovations even if complementary assets are
generic or unimportant.
Effectively, these arguments suggest that, with-
out the right positioning, an innovator can have
the right co-specialized complementary assets and
still not be able to profit from innovations, even
when the appropriability regime for the innova-
tion is tight. Positioning can be just as important
as – if not more – appropriability regimes and
complementary assets in profiting from an inno-
vation.
2.2. Beyond PMP: the cooperative side of
positioning
Another side exists in positioning: the cooperative
side. A firm’s relationship with its co-opetitors
can facilitate reduction in cost and creation of
superior value. For example, Dyer and Nobeoka
(2000) show that one of the advantages that
Toyota has over its competitors is its relationship
cultivated with its networks of suppliers. Rather
than exercising the bargaining power over its
suppliers and extract low prices for components
as its competitors do, Toyota works closely with
suppliers to lower their costs. Suppliers’ networks
are not only able to lower costs collectively than
each supplier could alone, but they are better able
to develop newer and better components for
Toyota. Thus, a firm that is well positioned within
a network of co-opetitors can keep its costs low
through cooperation and not necessarily through
exercising bargaining power, as the PMP view of
the firm would suggest.
A firm’s position within a network can better
innovation and obtain the necessary complemen-
tary assets. Such network can be that of profes-
sionals within and outside the firm that trade
know-how (Allen, 1984; von Hippel, 1987; Schra-
der, 1991; Walter et al., 2007) of firms along the
innovation value-adding chain (Bekkers et al.,
2002; Chesbrough, 2003), or of firms that colla-
borate with university laboratories and govern-
ments. A firm that is well positioned within such a
network is likely to have better and earlier access
to important new information than its rivals
(Burt, 2000; Si and Bruton, 2005). As Funk
(2003) demonstrates, a firm with a slight informa-
tion advantage can exploit them to obtain pre-







































Figure 2. The role of an innovator’s positioning beyond complementary assets and imitability.
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increase its chances of influencing the resulting
dominant design or standard. Since users, suppli-
ers, complementors, and university laboratories
can also be sources of innovation (von Hippel,
1987, 2005), a firm that is well positioned vis-à-vis
any of these co-opetitors has a better chance of
finding out about the innovation first and having
the option of being the first to invest in them.
3. Positioning and new game strategies
If co-opetitors can use their power to sap an
innovator’s profits, an important question arises:
What can an innovator do to better position vis-
à-vis co-opetitors and prevent profits from dis-
sipating? Or, can a firm move from Quadrants I
and II of Figure 2 to Quadrants III and IV?
Equally important, can an innovator better posi-
tion to work with co-opetitors in creating and
appropriating value? The answer to both ques-
tions is yes: activities exist, which an innovator
can perform to better position to profit from
innovations.
3.1. The roots of positioning
The concept of positioning is rooted in the
assumptions of the neoclassical economic para-
digm of perfect competition. Under perfect com-
petition, an innovator buys inputs from suppliers
at the suppliers’ cost and sells innovations to
customers at the cost of innovation. That is,
innovators expect to earn zero economic rents
under perfect competition. In such equilibrium
conditions, no innovator has power over co-
opetitors and vice versa. In this perfect competi-
tion world, firms make money by minimizing
their costs – or as Williamson (1999: 1088) put
it, by ‘economizing.’ However, if an innovator
can do something to make the market deviate
from perfect competition, the firm potentially can
earn economic rents. For example, a firm can
differentiate its products by advertising, or create
barriers to entry by protecting intellectual prop-
erty. Effectively, the essence of positioning is
about performing activities that allow a firm to
create conditions that move the market signifi-
cantly away from perfect competition and put the
firm in a position to collect economic rents
from the ‘inefficiency’ so created. One way to
create significant departures from perfect compe-
tition conditions, introduced below, is new game
strategies.
3.2. New game strategies
A new game strategy is a set of activities that
differ considerably from those performed by
other firms and that stand to redefine the basis
of competitive advantage in the industry (Buaron,
1981; Afuah, 2003). Effectively, new game activ-
ities differ from the prevailing activities per-
formed by the industry and often overturn
existing ways of doing things in the industry or
market. When an innovator successfully performs
new game activities, innovator distances further
from the conditions of perfect competition,
thereby better positioning herself to appropriate
the value that the innovation creates.
An example of a new game strategy is Dell’s
decision to sell directly to end-customers rather
than through distributors such as CompUSA; so
is its decision to introduce build-to-order – taking
customer’s orders before building computers.
Until Dell became successful at selling directly
to end-users, PC makers considered distributors
indispensable. Bypassing distributors and going
directly to end-customers was very different from
the way things had been done in the industry.
So was build-to-order. More importantly by
going direct, Dell was actually increasing its
bargaining power over customers since the com-
pany was moving from the more concentrated
and powerful distributors to the more fragmented
end-customers (businesses and consumers).
3.3. Deriving new game strategies
One way to explore an innovator’s choices in
performing new game activities is to start with
the perfect competition assumptions, and analyze
what happens when each assumption is ‘violated’
to move an innovator to a position where it can
collect economic rents (Table 2).
3.3.1. Atomicity
The atomicity assumption of perfect competition
presumes that a large number of actors (buyers
and sellers) with similar strategies and capabil-
ities, each of whom cannot exert significant influ-
ence on the market alone. Thus each firm is a
price taker. One firm characteristic that exerts
significant influence over a market is its size. For
example, a large innovator can use buying power
to extract concessions from suppliers. Low cost
(from say, scale economies) can also enable a
large firm to set price at levels that have an impact
on the market, especially the ability of imitators
to compete. Moreover, as pointed out by
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Schumpeter (1950), large firms are better at in-
novation because they can afford to undertake
many projects and can spread their risks over the
many projects, and have marketing resources.
They also have manufacturing capabilities (com-
plementary assets) to allow them commercialize
their innovations (Grosse, 1992).
In any case, the important question here is, what
type of new game activities can a firm perform to
increase size or build other capabilities that will
exert significant influence on the market or its co-
opetitors? One answer is new game strategies. Since,
by definition, new game activities differ from the
prevailing activities performed by industry firms, a
firm that performs a new game activity is effectively
moving first as far as the activity is concerned. Such
a firm can therefore enjoy the first-mover advan-
tages that go with being the first to perform the
activity in question. According to Lieberman and
Montgomery (1988, 1998) and Finney et al. (2008), a
firm that moves first can accumulate scarce difficult-
to-imitate resources and capabilities, start earning
important revenues from the technology earlier,
establish important relationships with co-opetitors,
move up the learning curve for the technology, and
increase its chances of winning a standard. These
can enable an innovator to better position relative to
co-opetitors. For example, Dell’s new game strategy
of selling directly to end-customers and building
computers to their customers’ orders established
important relationships with business customers
and to moved up the learning curve of running a
build-to-order system.
In markets that exhibit network externalities,
new game activities can allow a firm to win a
standard or dominant design and enjoy the asso-
ciated benefits. Sun Microsystems was the first
company in the computer workstation industry to
Table 2. Role of new game activities moving an innovator away from perfect competition into profits
Perfect competition
assumption
Possible new game activities
that innovator can pursue
Benefits to innovator of
deviation from assumption
The case of Lipitor





First-mover advantages Alliance with Pfizer that later
resulted in acquisition. Beyond
complementary assets, it had
positioning effects as a result of
the bigger new firm. Could
affect market considerably by
pricing its drug low
2. Homogeneity of
products
Invest in R&D or
advertising to
differentiate product
Invest to win dominant
design or win a standard
Differentiating a product
can establish pull on
customers or on suppliers
Direct-to-consumer marketing
of prescription drugs had been
unheard of until the advent of
Lipitor. Established a pull at
patients since the latter could
tell their doctors what drug
they want
3. Free entry and exit Build barriers to entry
Take advantage of
competitor’s inability to exit
old technology market
Barriers-to-entry can allow
a firm to exercise some level
of ‘monopoly’ power
Patenting of Lipitor. FDA






integration can give a firm
an information advantage
Partial integration, allows





Alliance with Pfizer gives
Warner Lambert access to
Pfizer’s large sales force. This
means better access to
information from doctors.
Direct-to-consumer advertising
also gives patients more
information than they ever had
before





gives innovator access to
scarce resources
In pharmaceuticals, a sales
force is a rare and valuable
resource (Mitchell, 1989). By
allying with Pfizer, Warner
Lambert is making resources
more scarce
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make its reduced instruction set computer (RISC)
technology readily available to any firm that
wanted to adopt the new technology (Garud and
Kumaraswamy, 1993; Afuah, 2000). This helped
the company’s version of RISC to win the stan-
dard. Sun was at the center of the network, having
more access to important technology and comple-
mentary asset information than other members of
the network. Effectively, new game activities can
enable an innovator to build the right capabilities,
thereby making the market less ‘perfect’ and collect
economic rents from innovations.
3.3.2. Homogeneity of products
In perfect competition, the product is a non-differ-
entiated commodity. An innovator can differenti-
ate products in two ways: through R&D activities
that produce distinctive product features during
innovation or through advertising activities that
change the way customers perceive the product. By
performing new game R&D or advertising activ-
ities, a firm can better position itself relative to the
co-opetitors. This is illustrated by Intel’s ‘Intel
Inside’ campaign in which the firm advertised
directly to end-users, bypassing the PC makers
who bought their microprocessors. The goal in
advertising to end-users, one stage downstream
the value chain, is to establish a pull on one’s direct
customers thereby reducing their power. That is, if
Dell’s customers want PCs with Intel Inside, Dell
would rather buy microprocessors from Intel than
from AMD. Bypassing one’s customers to adver-
tise directly to end-customers was a new game
activity for the microprocessor industry because
this has never been done in the industry before. As
an Intel executive would confide: ‘Intel Inside was
our best innovation.’
For products that exhibit network externalities,
a large network size can also differentiate a
product since the larger the size, the more valu-
able the network becomes to each user. Therefore,
any new activity that can enable a firm to win a
standard, thereby increasing the size of its net-
work, can override the homogeneity assumption
by differentiating the firm’s products through the
resulting larger network size.
3.3.3. Free entry and exit
Innovators would rather avoid the ‘no barriers to
entry or exit’ conditions of perfect competition by
erecting barriers to entry. An innovator can
use some of the same new game activities to
gain first-mover advantages as well as to erect
barriers to entry. Difficult-to-imitate resources
and capabilities, important relationships with
co-opetitors, experience, and the potential to
win a standard are all potential formidable bar-
riers to entry. Both the PMP and the RBVs of the
firm suggest that a firm that moves first often can
erect some barriers to entry into the market
segments in which they compete, even if they are
temporary. If in moving first, an innovator devel-
ops scarce and valuable capabilities that are
difficult to imitate, the innovator stands to profit
from them since, by definition, potential imitators
cannot replicate such capabilities. When imitators
try to catch up with an innovator in a limited
period of time by investing massive resources, low
innovation performance vis-à-vis invested re-
sources occurs, often called time compression
diseconomies. Also, strong complexity may occur
during the innovation process due to causal
ambiguity in the process and interconnectedness
amongst necessary resources and competencies
involved. These problems act to make it difficult
for imitators to catch up once an innovator moves
first (Dierickx and Cool, 1989).
Dell’s direct sales and build-to-order new game
strategy are made up of many activities that range
from the way the firm interacts and manages
suppliers, to the internal manufacturing opera-
tions activities that are fine-tuned to turn around
orders in 1.5 days, to how the firm and its
suppliers interact with end-customers (Fishburne,
1999). As Kevin Rollins, Dell’s CEO, puts it: ‘the
entire value chain has to work together to make it
efficient and effective’ (Fishburne, 1999: 59) mak-
ing it difficult for potential competitors to repli-
cate what Dell does.
3.3.4. Perfect and complete information
In interacting with co-opetitors in the face of an
innovation, information is usually anything but
complete or perfect as would be suggested by the
perfect competition model. An underlying assump-
tion in the postulation that actors have perfect and
complete information is that these actors are ra-
tional and that such information can costlessly
move between actors. However, most individuals
and organizations are boundedly rational, not
perfectly rational (Nelson and Winter, 1982). It is
difficult for cognitively limited actors to transfer
knowledge, especially when such knowledge is tacit
or is of large quantity (e.g., von Hippel, 1994).
Therefore, transferring tacit knowledge between
boundedly rational actors often entails in-person,
face-to-face learning by doing or by experiencing.
Thus, new game activities that put an innovator in
a position to more closely interact with co-opetitors
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during innovation that requires the transfer of tacit
knowledge might help the innovator’s profitability.
Being boundedly rational in the face of an
innovation also means more room for opportu-
nism that can lead to high transaction costs when
some actors take advantage of information asym-
metries (Williamson, 2002). Such opportunism
can be mitigated by relationships that build trust
since trust reduces opportunism. Thus, any new
game activities that can put a firm in a position to
build trust would also help.
In the PMP view of strategy, a co-opetitor with
an information advantage can use it to advantage
during bargaining. Thus, one thing that a firm can
do to reduce such information asymmetries is to
integrate vertically partially into the co-opetitor’s
activity. By doing so, a firm can obtain better
information about the cost of components and is
in a better position to negotiate with suppliers.
Finally, since a slight information advantage can
give an actor preferential access to important
complementary assets (Funk, 2003), an innovator
may want to position in the so-called ‘structural
holes’ giving the innovator information advan-
tage (Burt, 1992; Zaheer and Bell, 2005).
3.3.5. Equal access to resources
In the face of an innovation, firms usually do not
have equal access to all resources as assumed by
the perfect competition paradigm. Several reasons
exist for unequal access to resources. First, each
actor’s initial endowments may be different. Such
endowments include absorptive capacities and
since it takes related knowledge to absorb knowl-
edge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Nielsen, 2005),
firms with lower absorptive capacities are at a
disadvantage as far as access to knowledge-based
resources is concerned. Much research is available
on alliances and cooperations through external
sourcing and competencies (Hagedoorn, 1993,
2002; Belderbos et al., 2004; Aschhoff and
Schmidt, 2008). According to these studies, firms
with various and plentiful partnerships have bet-
ter access to valuable resources for winning in the
market. Recently much research has focused on
firms reaching beyond firm boundaries to access
external knowledge, technology, resources, and
competencies, in order to innovate, and in cases
successfully bringing innovations to the market
by delegating to external organizations altogether
(Keil, 2002; Chesbrough, 2003). These studies
show that traditional boundaries are becoming
blurred and external partnership networks are
becoming more expedient in achieving technolo-
gical innovations and its market success.
Second, resources may be scarce and difficult to
replicate or transfer. Third, it may be difficult to
identify just what exactly the resources are all
about. An innovator that has better access to
resources stands to better profit from innovations
than those that do not. One way for a firm to have
unique access to resources is to perform new game
activities that give it first-mover advantages. To
illustrate why, consider again the Dell example.
By moving first to direct sales and build-to-order,
Dell was able to build relationships with large
businesses. Once these businesses lock into Dell’s
system, other PC makers find displacing Dell very
difficult.
4. Drivers of new game strategy
effectiveness
The fact that new game activities can put an
innovator in a better position to profit from
innovation raises an interesting question: What
would make some new game strategies more
effective in positioning an innovator than others?
Two factors determine the effectiveness of a new
game activity: (1) the extent to which the inno-
vator takes advantage of industry’s value drivers,
and (2) the degree to which co-opetitor’s prior
commitments prevent them from imitating the
innovator.
4.1. Industry’s value drivers
Every industry has some characteristics that stand
to have a significant impact on the value that
firms can create in the industry. For example, in
the video game industry, network externalities are
critical to the value that each gamer derives from
owning a particular game console. Thus, new
game activities that take advantage of such va-
lue-driving characteristics stand to have a signifi-
cant impact on value in the industry. To illustrate
this point further, take the Dell example earlier.
In the PC industry, the technology quickly be-
comes obsolete while prices drop. A direct sales
and build-to-order strategy enabled Dell to get
PCs to end-consumers rapidly.
4.2. Co-opetitor’s prior commitments
In performing its activities in an industry, a firm
usually makes commitments in the form of
investments, contracts, network relationships,
agreements, and understandings with coopetitors.
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Such commitments can prevent an imitator from
performing new game activities when an innova-
tor moves first, and vice versa. Compaq’s case
offers an interesting example. To compete with
Dell, Compaq wanted to adopt a build-to-order
model and sells directly to consumers, bypassing
distributors. Citing previous agreements, distri-
butors refused to cooperate and Compaq had to
give up its new business model.
5. The case of Lipitor
This section introduces and briefly describes the
Lipitor case to provide practical implications for
the execution of new game strategy. The type of
technological environment in which a product is
developed can play an important role in the type
of new game activities that an innovator can
perform effectively. In the face of a radical
technological change (in the organizational
sense), most new innovation activities are likely
to be new game since, by definition, a radical
innovation usually involves fundamentally differ-
ent skills (e.g., Henderson and Clark, 1990).
Moreover, in the face of a radical innovation,
an incumbent’s capabilities might not only be-
come obsolete, they may actually handicap the
incumbent’s efforts to exploit the change (Leo-
nard-Barton, 1992). Thus, a firm that performs
new game activities in the face of a radical
technological change is likely to have less of a
challenge from incumbents since their efforts can
be handicapped by prior commitments in the old
technology. Lipitor is a cholesterol-reducing drug
that belongs to a family of cholesterol drugs
called statins. New drug development in pharma-
ceutical industry is a typical case of radical
technological change. Lipitor is a late mover
because it is the third or fourth drug from a
drug family such as statins. Therefore, the
success of Lipitor is a suitable case to explain
and demonstrate the new game strategy frame-
work.
The story of Lipitor has elements of appropria-
bility, complementary assets, and positioning and
therefore serves as a good case to use to illustrate
the role of positioning in the face of a technolo-
gical innovation. Lipitor was the fifth statin to be
introduced and yet went on to become the world’s
best-selling drug. This is striking because until
Lipitor, the third or fourth drug from a drug
family such as statin usually had a very small
chance of surviving, let alone of capturing a
substantial market share. A major reason for
Lipitor’s success despite being such a late member
of its family was the new game activities that the
inventor, Warner Lambert (and later, Pfizer),
sought to improve its position. In Figure 2, the
cholesterol drugs that preceded Lipitor are in
Quadrant II. By performing new game activities,
the Warner Lambert/Pfizer team was able to
move Lipitor from Quadrant II to III. More
detailed description of the new game strategy of
the Warner Lambert/Pfizer team is described in
the next section.
5.1. Direct-to-consumer marketing
In direct-to-consumer (DTC) marketing, a
pharmaceutical company markets (advertises,
promotes, etc.) a drug directly to patients, instead
of to doctors. While direct promotion and adver-
tising to customers has been commonplace with
over-the-counter drugs, it had never been prac-
ticed in prescription cholesterol drugs until Lipi-
tor. Prescription drug marketing had targeted
doctors, not patients. By taking its message di-
rectly to patients, Warner Lambert was bypassing
the more powerful doctors to go directly to the
less informed and more fragmented patients.
Conceptually, direct-to-patient marketing makes
sense because of an important characteristic of
the market in question: Having high cholesterol
levels is a non-symptomatic disease where people
who suffer from it do not usually feel any pain
until it may be too late. Thus, by appealing
directly to consumers, a firm is more likely to
get patients to have their cholesterol levels
checked and become customers. By deviating
from perfect competition conditions, DTC
further differentiated Lipitor in the eyes of pa-
tients, thereby reducing product homogeneity
(Table 2). More importantly, it established a
pull at the patient level of the value chain, thereby
eroding at the power of doctors. Note that DTC
takes away some of doctor’s power.
5.2. Alliance with Pfizer
According to Mitchell (1989), a sales force is a
critical co-specialized complementary asset in
pharmaceuticals. When Warner Lambert intro-
duced Lipitor, it already had a sales force that it
had used to sell an earlier non-statin cholesterol
drug. But the company decided that a larger sales
force might be better and sought an alliance with
Pfizer. The latter had a large sales force with
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access to cardiovascular specialists but had no
cholesterol drug. Pfizer and Warner Lambert
formed a strategic alliance that would later
lead to Pfizer’s acquisition of Warner Lambert.
The combined marketing and sales resources gave
the team the largest sales force and marketing
resources dedicated to cholesterol. Although,
on the surface, this alliance appears to be a
textbook case of a firm with an invention team-
ing up with one that has complementary
assets (Teece, 1986), there is more to this union
than what meets the eye. Since Warner Lambert
already had a cholesterol sales force, the primary
effect of the alliance with Pfizer was to increase
the size and quality of the sales force. By teaming
up with Pfizer, Warner Lambert was effectively
increasing size in the cholesterol drug market
and its ability to influence the market. Thus,
teaming up with Pfizer constituted a ‘violation’
of the atomicity and equal access to resources
assumptions.
5.3. Head-to-head trials
For a drug to be marketed as a cure for a
particular ailment in the United States, the drug
must undergo clinical testing and be approved by
the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
During Lipitor clinical trials, Warner Lambert
ordered head-to-head comparison of the drug’s
attributes against those of the four statins that
had already been approved by the FDA and were
in the market. The ability of each drug to reduce
total cholesterol, bad cholesterol [low-density
lipoprotein (LDL)] and triglycerides as well as
the ability to raise the level of so-called good
cholesterol [high-density lipoprotein (HDL)] was
measured and a comparison made between Lipi-
tor and competing drugs. Head-to-head compar-
isons of a new drug by a pharmaceutical company
had been unheard of before Lipitor. The results of
the testing showed Lipitor to reduce LDL by
40–60% compared with the best-selling drug in
the market at the time, Zocor, which reduced
LDL by only 40%. Lipitor also reduced triglycer-
ides by 19–40% compared with 17% for Zocor.
One reason why the third, fourth, and fifth drugs
to be introduced in a market usually do not do
very well is because doctors do not like to switch
medications unless for compelling reasons. By
pursuing head-to-head trials and demonstrating
that Lipitor was superior in several performance
measures, Warner Lambert gave doctors compel-
ling reasons to switch.
5.4. Additional clinical trials
One of Warner Lambert’s early decisions was to
focus on the bad effects of triglycerides (brother/
sister apoproteins to cholesterol). Although tri-
glycerides were believed to be another culprit for
coronary artery disease, the focus of previous
makers of cholesterol drugs had been on total
cholesterol and LDL as the culprits. Earlier
statins were approved by the FDA for total
cholesterol and LDL but not triglycerides. Thus,
by targeting triglycerides, the Warner Lambert/
Pfizer team was also able to better position itself
as the first for the ‘illness’ as far as statins were
concerned.
During clinical testing, Warner Lambert also
performed clinical testing for a fatal hereditary
condition that resulted in extremely high choles-
terol levels called familial hypercholesteromia
(Leafstedt et al., 2003). This allowed Lipitor to
be qualified for so-called ‘fast track’ review since
no drug had been approved to treat the condition
before. This shortened the review process by
6 months. By obtaining approval for the drug
6 months earlier, Warner Lambert was effectively
extending Lipitor’s patent life – the time over
which the company could collect monopoly rents
on the drug before the patent expired – by
6 months.
5.5. Low entry prices
The Warner Lambert/Pfizer team also decided to
set the price of Lipitor lower than all but one of
the cholesterol drugs in the market at the time,
despite the drug’s much higher performance attri-
butes. This was unusual since pharmaceutical
companies usually follow a skimming pricing
strategy for products with superior performance
so as to extract profits before their patents run
out. Lipitor’s lower price allowed it to be placed
in the formularies of Pharmaceuticals Benefits
Managers, the organizations that manage costs
for Management Health Organizations. Patients
are not reimbursed for a drug by an HMO’s
insurance company if the drug is not on the
formulary.
5.6. Interrelatedness of new game
activities for Lipitor
Each of the activities improves Lipitor’s position-
ing somewhat. Taken together as a system, these
activities are even more effective in improving
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Lipitor’s positioning. Getting on fast track FDA
review not only gave Warner Lambert an extra 6
months during which it could earn revenues
before the Lipitor patent expired, it also gave
the company the option to set other new game
activities into motion 6 months earlier. In a
market segment with both technological and
market uncertainty, 6 months has an option value
(Bowman and Hurry, 1993). For example, with
an extra 6 months, Warner Lambert has more
options as to when, how and which tools to use in
launching its DTC marketing. Options in finding
a partner to team up with are also larger.
DTC may have been effective alone, but it was
more effective when combined with a large sales
force (from the Warner Lambert /Pfizer alliance).
On the one hand, having a larger sales force
meant that patients who went to their doctors to
ask for a cholesterol drug were more likely to find
a doctor who could prescribe Lipitor rather than
another statin. On the other hand, having a large
sales force that tries to sell a fifth non-sympto-
matic drug to doctors might not help as much if
DTC marketing influences patients. Effectively,
both actions are reinforcing. Setting Lipitor’s
price low took advantage of a health management
community that was becoming increasingly price
conscious. But the low prices would not be as
effective if not enough patients and doctors
wanted the drug. The large sales force and DTC
marketing helped the effectiveness of the low
price strategy.
Effectively, these new game activities made a
difference between Lipitor and the four preceding
statins. Each of the first four statins – Mevacor by
Merck, Pravachol by Bristol Myers Squibb, Zo-
cor by Merck, and Lescol by Norvatis – were
patented and therefore had a tight appropriability
regime. Their owners also had the right co-
specialized complementary assets (sales force,
etc.). Therefore the difference between Lipitor
and earlier drugs rests largely in factors beyond
the appropriability regime and having comple-
mentary assets. Warner Lambert/Pfizer’s new
game activities appear to have made a difference.
Figure 3 shows the positioning of Lipitor.
6. Discussion and conclusion
Invention and innovation are completely different
concepts. Invention refers to the discovery of new
knowledge. Innovation, on the other hand, refers
to attempts to commercialize inventions (Free-
man and Soete, 1997). Development of a new
drug such as Lipitor is an example of invention.
New game strategy of Warner Lambert/Pfizer
team transformed an invention to an innovation
and drove a successful marketing of Lipitor in the
pharmaceutical industry. Although many high-
tech firms invent and develop new technologies
and products continuously, they are not brought
to market successfully and finally perish because
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Figure 3. Result of new game activities for Lipitor.
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firms tend to focus their resources and capabilities
on invention. However, firms should execute
appropriate strategies for successfully commercia-
lizing their invention. The new game strategy
framework can be a useful guideline for the
success of invention in market and the accom-
plishment of innovation.
This paper showed that, beyond appropriabil-
ity regime and complementary assets, an inno-
vator’s positioning vis-à-vis co-opetitors can also
determine whether the innovator can profit from
innovations. First, even a firm with an innova-
tion that is difficult to imitate and has relevant
critical complementary assets may still not be
able to profit from the innovation if such a firm is
not well positioned vis-à-vis co-opetitors. Sec-
ond, an innovator can attain the right position-
ing by performing new game activities. Starting
with the underlying assumptions of the neoclas-
sical economics’ ideal world of perfect competi-
tion as the theoretical anchor, this paper showed
how an innovator can use new game strategies to
better position to profit from innovations. New
game strategies enable firms to rewrite the rules
of the game in an industry or market. A new
game strategy works best when the player takes
advantage of industry value drivers and co-
opetitors’ prior commitments prevent them
from replicating the player’s game. One implica-
tion of this framework is that imitators can win,
not so much because of their complementary
assets or the high imitability of the innovation,
but because of the new game strategies that they
pursue to give them an advantageous position
vis-à-vis co-opetitors. The case of Lipitor de-
monstrated the importance of positioning in
profiting from an innovation. In particular,
Warner Lambert’s new game activities may
have played a role in making Lipitor the world’s
best-selling drug.
Three types of positions can help an innovator
better profit from innovations. The first is the
PMP-type positioning in which the innovator
seeks to attain and exercise bargaining power
while being protected by high barriers to entry.
The second is positioning within a network of co-
opetitors in which, rather than using the position
to exercise bargaining power, an innovator uses it
to cooperate more effectively to lower costs for
both the innovator and co-opetitors, and to create
value for the value chain. The third type of
positioning is when a firm’s position within a
network gives better access to information than
does competitors. Such a privileged position for
information not only leads to better access to
innovations (since co-opetitors are often sources
of innovation) but also to better access to com-
plementary assets.
Implications for managers of innovation activ-
ities include the following points. Profiting from
innovation takes more than the right innovation
and associating complementary assets. Position-
ing also plays a critical role and therefore new
game activities that better position an innovator
to profit from innovations should receive as much
attention as complementary assets acquisition
and innovation activities. Policy makers are also
better off taking the role of positioning into
consideration during decision-making time than
at a later phase, or as in many cases, not given any
considerations at all.
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